nep-hpe 2014-02-08, 9 papers

NEP: New Economics Papers
History and Philosophy of Economics

Edited by: Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba
Issue date: 2014-02-08
Papers: 9

NEP is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Victoria University of Wellington.
Access to full contents may be restricted. To subscribe/unsubscribe follow this link;http://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-hpe

In this issue we have:

  1. In memoriam of Professor Ronald Coase Ana Lourenço
  2. In Search of the Banking Regulator amid U.S. Financial Reforms of the 1930s Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe
  3. Short‐Run Macro After the Crisis: The End of the “New” Neoclassical Synthesis? Oliver Landmann
  4. Between efficiency and effectiveness Sergey V. Tretyakov
  5. Income growth and happiness: Reassessment of the Easterlin Paradox Beja Jr., Edsel
  6. Personnel Economics essay: Issues in Human Capital Theory, training and earnings of workers Josheski, Dushko
  7. Economic Growth Evens-Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys Andrew E. Clark; Sarah Flèche; Claudia Senik
  8. Institutionen und historische Grenzen Jürgen Jerger
  9. Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Oswald, Andrew J.

Contents.

  1. In memoriam of Professor Ronald Coase
    Date: 2013-12
    By: Ana Lourenço (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão – Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Porto)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cap:wpaper:062013&r=hpe
    This article was written as a tribute to Professor Ronald Coase. It acknowledges his scholarly contributions to understanding the existence and boundaries of the firm, and the role of legal rules in organizing economic activity. It also recognizes the reflexivity, realism, simplicity and wit inherent to the work of Professor Ronald Coase.
  2. In Search of the Banking Regulator amid U.S. Financial Reforms of the 1930s
    Date: 2014-01-15
    By: Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe (Larefi – Laboratoire d’analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales – Université Montesquieu – Bordeaux IV : EA2954)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00937533&r=hpe
    Some bank reforms of the 1930s in the United States may have been overvalued. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 actually created new endogenous risks involving potential systemic effects. Deposit insurance failed to address the main cause of banking panics, and rather strengthened inefficient unit banks, while the prohibition of interstate bank branching continued to hinder banks to diversify idiosyncratic risks. The separation of commercial and investment banking put an end to certain conflicts of interest but it created an opportunity cost by preventing universal banking from developing effectively. Finally, an untimely intervention in a duopolistic conflict made the regulator a captive figure. By contrast, major innovations covering bailout processes and prudential regulation appear to have been underestimated. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation of 1932 established the foundations of an investor of last resort, giving the Treasury the authority to recapitalize insolvent financial institutions deemed too big to fail. The newly established banking regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of 1933, was given a special bank-closure rule, separate from the usual bankruptcy proceedings, which opened a way towards orderly resolution of failing banks in order to protect the economy from the spread of systemic risk.
    Keywords: bank reform, United States, Regulation, Economic history
  3. Short‐Run Macro After the Crisis: The End of the “New” Neoclassical Synthesis?
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Oliver Landmann (Institut für allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Freiburg)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fre:wpaper:27&r=hpe
    The Financial Crisis of 2008, and the Great Recession in its wake, have shaken up macroeconomics. The paradigm of the “New” Neoclassical Synthesis, which seemed to provide a robust framework of analysis for short‐run macro not long ago, fails to capture key elements of the recent crisis. This paper reviews the current reappraisal of the paradigm in the light of the history of macroeconomic thought. Twice in the past 80 years, a major macroeconomic crisis led to the breakthrough of a new paradigm that was to capture the imagination of an entire generation of macroeconomists. This time is different. Whereas the pre‐crisis consensus in the profession is broken, a sweeping transition to a single new paradigm is not in sight. Instead, macroeconomics is in the process of loosening the methodological straightjacket of the “New” Neoclassical Synthesis, thereby opening a door for a return to its original purpose: the study of information and coordination in a market economy.
    Keywords: Financial Crisis, Great Recession, Macroeconomics, New Neoclassical Synthesis, Keynesian Economics, New Classical Economics, Great Moderation
    JEL: B22 B40 E10 E12 E13
  4. Between efficiency and effectiveness
    Date: 2014
    By: Sergey V. Tretyakov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:31/law/2014&r=hpe
    The main idea of this paper is that some sort of legal theory dealing with the law’s social impact is an indispensable element of the legal profession in the time of late modernity. Can legal theory pro-vide an adequate understanding of the social context of the application of law, relying solely on in-ternal resources? If not, which interdisiplinary discourse is the best and why?
    Keywords: efficiency, effectiveness, social context of law, neoclassical economics, behav-ioral law and economics, Hart, Kelsen, Sunstein, Glaeser
    JEL: K10
  5. Income growth and happiness: Reassessment of the Easterlin Paradox
    Date: 2014-02-01
    By: Beja Jr., Edsel
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53360&r=hpe
    This paper presents evidence of a positive but very small long run relationship between income growth and happiness, evidence that can disprove the Easterlin Paradox. However, the paper argues that there is actually reason to sustain the paradox because it finds the magnitude of the estimated relationship too small to suggest that income growth has substantial consequence in improving happiness over the long-term. Certainly, the evidence suggests that happiness is more than about raising incomes. This paper argues that a rejection of the paradox is acceptable if and only if the empirical findings indicate economic significance.
    Keywords: Easterlin Paradox; income growth; happiness; dynamics
    JEL: A20 C53 I30 O40
  6. Personnel Economics essay: Issues in Human Capital Theory, training and earnings of workers
    Date: 2014-01-31
    By: Josheski, Dushko
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53295&r=hpe
    In this paper the issues from the personnel economics has been investigated. The issues such as training of workers from Becker’s human capital theory and their association with the workers’ productivity. In the second part of the paper the issue of grooming has been investigated in relation with earnings for which there exist and it is presented empirical evidence. In the equation as regressors are also present Mincerian variables: age, marital status and others. Also the four puzzles in the empirical literature about the determinants of earnings has been investigated. And how the empirical literature helps in resolving them.
    Keywords: Personnel economics, training, earnings, grooming
    JEL: M50 M52 M53
  7. Economic Growth Evens-Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))

    Sarah Flèche (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))

    Claudia Senik (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), UP4 – Université Paris 4, Paris-Sorbonne – Université Paris IV – Paris Sorbonne – Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique)

    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00936145&r=hpe
    In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has dropped in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the "very unhappy" and the "perfectly happy". The extension of public amenities has certainly contributed to this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact comes as an addition to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries.
    Keywords: Happiness ; Inequality ; Economic growth ; Development ; Easterlin paradox
  8. Institutionen und historische Grenzen
    Date: 2013-12
    By: Jürgen Jerger (IOS Regensburg)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ost:wpaper:336&r=hpe
    The relevance of (political) borders on the one hand and of historical conditions on the other hand for some of today’s aspects of ec onomic and social reality is well established in both theoretical and empirical research in economics as wel as in other disciplines. More surprising are empirical results that point to a long-lasting relevance of historical borders that may still exert causal on effects on present conditions and observations. This paper argues that the explanation of these effects is a demanding, albeit potentially very rewarding challenge for institutional economics in particular and an interdisciplinary research program in general.
  9. Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Powdthavee, Nattavudh (London School of Economics)
    Oswald, Andrew J. (University of Warwick)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7934&r=hpe
    The causes of people’s political attitudes are largely unknown. We study this issue by exploiting longitudinal data on lottery winners. Comparing people before and after a lottery windfall, we show that winners tend to switch towards support for a right-wing political party and to become less egalitarian. The larger the win, the more people tilt to the right. This relationship is robust to (i) different ways of defining right-wing, (ii) a variety of estimation methods, and (iii) methods that condition on the person previously having voted left. It is strongest for males. Our findings are consistent with the view that voting is driven partly by human self-interest. Money apparently makes people more right-wing.
    Keywords: voting, gender, lottery wins, political preferences, income, attitudes
    JEL: D1 D72 H1 J7

nep-hpe 2014-02-02, 23 papers

NEP: New Economics Papers
History and Philosophy of Economics

Edited by: Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba
Issue date: 2014-02-02
Papers: 23

This issue of nep-hpe is sponsored by Michigan State University, who are inviting applications for ÊSTIMATE – Early Summer Tutorial in Modern Applied Tools of Econometrics. Find out more and apply here: http://inomics.com/node/16862.

Access to full contents may be restricted. To subscribe/unsubscribe follow this link;http://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-hpe

In this issue we have:

  1. A Methodological Reading of “The Economic Consequences of the Peace". Carabelli, Anna M.; Cedrini, Mario
  2. Rueff et l’analyse du chômage : Quels héritages? Georges Prat
  3. Keynes’s General Theory, Treatise on Money and Tract on Monetary Reform: Different Theories, Same Methodological Approach? Carabelli, Anna Maria; Cedrini, Mario Aldo
  4. Walter Eucken’s role in the early history of the Mont Pèlerin Society Kolev, Stefan; Goldschmidt, Nils; Hesse, Jan-Otmar
  5. The Role of Homo Oeconomicus in the Political Economy of James Buchanan Kirchgässner, Gebhard
  6. Еconomic theory and the New-Keynesian school Josheski, Dushko; Magdinceva-Sopova, Marija
  7. Strategic Ambiguity in Games Riedel, Frank; Sass, Linda
  8. Selfish Altruism, Fierce Cooperation and the Emergence of Cooperative Equilibria from Passing and Shooting Askitas, Nikos
  9. A Dynamic Model of Belief-Dependent Conformity to Social Norms Sontuoso, Alessandro
  10. The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree Brink J.R. van den; Talman A.J.J.; Herings P.J.J.; Laan G. van der
  11. Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining Herings P.J.J.; Meshalkin A.V.; Predtetchinski A.
  12. Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions Vermeulen A.J.; Schröder M.J.W.; Peters H.J.M.
  13. From sets of equilibria to structures of interaction underlying binary games of strategic complements Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
  14. Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets Elyès Jouini; Clotilde Napp; Yannick Viossat
  15. Rock, Paper, Scissors, Lizard, Spock: Two-Person circulant Games Kern, Johannes; Granic, Dura-Georg
  16. The Virtue Ethics Hypothesis: Is there a nexus between virtues and well-being? Koch, Christian
  17. Voting in collective stopping games Herings P.J.J.; Predtetchinski A.
  18. A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes Rodrigo Harrison; Pedro Jara-Moroni
  19. Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring Itai Arieliy; Yehuda (John) Levy
  20. Claim games for estate division problems Vermeulen A.J.; Schröder M.J.W.; Peters H.J.M.
  21. Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action Abhijit Banerjee; Esther Duflo
  22. Moral hypocrisy: Self-deception or impression management? Walkowitz, Gari; Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik; Irlenbusch, Bernd
  23. "The Rational Expectations Hypothesis: An Assessment from Popper’s Philosophy" Ivan H. Ayala; Alfonso Palacio-Vera

Contents.

  1. A Methodological Reading of “The Economic Consequences of the Peace".
    Date: 2013-12
    By: Carabelli, Anna M.
    Cedrini, Mario (University of Turin)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:dipeco:201351&r=hpe
    The paper provides a methodological reading of Keynes’s “The Economic Consequences of the Peace”. Drawing on the close interdependence between theory and method in Keynes’s economics, which he considered as a branch of logic, a correct way of reasoning about a complex economic material, we reconstruct the rationale of Keynes’s imaginative solutions for the troubles caused by WWI and the Versailles Treaty. We thereby shed light on a method of thinking out the specific problems of international economic relations that Keynes will be consistently using (though adapting it to changing times and circumstances) in his work of international economics and diplomacy. A method which will have a direct influence on the contents of Key nes’s Bretton Woods reform plans, and may be of great importance in directing European policy-makers to a structural reform of the continent’s economic architecture.
  2. Rueff et l’analyse du chômage : Quels héritages?
    Date: 2014
    By: Georges Prat
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-1&r=hpe
    This paper shows that, Rueff (1925, 1931) distinguished [a] a « permanent » unemployment due to excessive real wages relative to the labor productivity, [b] a “temporary” unemployment due to a decline in the economic activity resulting from a cyclic decrease of the price level, and [c] a « minimum » frictional unemployment prevailing in the normal functioning of the economy. Using empirical data, Rueff suggested that the unemployment of type [a] was largely dominant in England during the 1920’s (i.e. the socalled « law of Rueff »). The confrontation between this analysis and the subsequent analysis of unemployment in the literature reveals that : (i) the Phillips curve and its extension with the NAIRU appears as a non-legacy ; (ii) the wage curve is in accordance with the « law of Rueff » and provides an interesting complement to it; (iii) the equation proposed by Allais to explain the french unemployment rate includes the three types of unemployment pointed out by Rueff; (iv) although now abandoned, the fixed price temporary equilibria theory includes the unemployment of type [a] with both the classical regime and the keynesian regime of unemployment ; (v) the new keynesian microeconomy of the labor market shows that unemployment of type [a] can be explained by the behavior of rational agents without involving rigidities imposed by the Government ; this result generalizes the concept of unemployment of type [a] but is a refutation of the possibility accepted by Rueff to get a competitive equilibrium in a labor market without exogenous rigidities; (vi) the imperfect competition WS-PS model based on negotiation between employees and employers appears in accordance with the three kinds of unemployment [a], [b] et [c] so that it can be seen in this model a synthesis joining Rueff and Allais.
    Keywords: unemployment, wage rigidities, Jacques Rueff
    JEL: E24 J2 J30 N34
  3. Keynes’s General Theory, Treatise on Money and Tract on Monetary Reform: Different Theories, Same Methodological Approach?
    Date: 2013-10
    By: Carabelli, Anna Maria
    Cedrini, Mario Aldo (University of Turin)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:dipeco:201344&r=hpe
    In trying to assess the content and significance of Keynes’s attempted revolution in economic methodology, historians have almost exclusively focused on the General Theory. By highlighting the legacy of the Treatise on Probability for Keynes’s economic writings, this paper provides evidence of strong methodologic al continuity between the Tract on Monetary Reform, the Treatise on Money and the General Theory, despite radical differences in the theories. We argue that the novelty of Keynes’s approach lies in offering a method of analysis requiring cooperation on the part of the reader, in the effort to tackle the complexity of the economic material.
  4. Walter Eucken’s role in the early history of the Mont Pèlerin Society
    Date: 2014
    By: Kolev, Stefan
    Goldschmidt, Nils
    Hesse, Jan-Otmar
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluord:1402&r=hpe
    In the history of economic thought Walter Eucken is mostly known for his impact in establishing the Social Market Economy in post-war Germany. Even though there is a growing interest in his ideas especially from an Austrian and a Constitutional Economics perspective, his influence on the discussions within neoliberalism and, more specifically, his impact in the course of the foundation of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) are not yet widely considered. In this paper we attempt to show that Eucken was very influential in the formation of the MPS and that German ordoliberalism had a significant imprint on the early history of the society. It is primarily Eucken’s correspondence with F. A. Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke in this context which we present and analyze, complementing it with some hypotheses about early influences between Eucken and Hayek in terms of methodology and epistemology. Subsequently we show, by regarding the first MPS meetings between 1947 and 1949 (general and organizational), that there was – even at this early stage in the development of the MPS – a widening gap between a Continental European and an Anglo-Saxon understanding of neoliberalism, despite the personal friendships and high collegial respect especially between Eucken, Hayek and Röpke; Ludwig von Mises playing a special role in this setting. We illustrate this development also by discussing personal memories of Leonhard Miksch, a student of Eucken and a participant of the MPS meeting in 1949, recorded in his so far unpublished diary. —
    Keywords: Neoliberalism,Mont Pèlerin Society,Ordoliberalism,History of Economic Thought,Political and Economic Order,Role of Economists
    JEL: A11 B25 B31 B41 H11
  5. The Role of Homo Oeconomicus in the Political Economy of James Buchanan
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Kirchgässner, Gebhard
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2014:03&r=hpe
    Whenever the economic model of behaviour is to be applied, the utility function has – at least somewhat – to be specified. Buchanan generally prefers to apply a rather narrow version. However, he acknowledges that it is hardly possible to explain actual behaviour of individuals with such a version, so in performing empirical economic research he accepts that we have to use a more open one. He also acknowledges that people might behave differently in markets than they do in politics; other-regarding behaviour might be more pronounced in politics as compared to markets. Which version should be applied in constitutional economics, however, is a different question. Following a long ongoing tradition in political philosophy, he insists that – for methodological reasons – the narrow version is the correct one to be applied; this is the way to compare different sets of rules when analysing the possible abuse of power by rulers in order to prevent it as far as possible. The same should also be taken into account when analysing the process of policy advice. The narrow Homo Oeconomicus model should, however, not be misunderstood as a normative prescription.
    Keywords: Homo Oeconomicus, Economic Model of Behaviour, Empirical Public Choice, Constitutional Economics, Self-Interest, Policy Advice
    JEL: B41
  6. Еconomic theory and the New-Keynesian school
    Date: 2014-01-30
    By: Josheski, Dushko
    Magdinceva-Sopova, Marija
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:90909&r=hpe
    In this paper it is described the school of neo-Keynesians (Akerlof and Stiglitz are in the group of ”Hard” New-Keynesians, that don’t accept New neo-classical synthesis, i.e. Dynamic Stochastic General equilibrium models-DSGE),that as a basic source of instability in the economies view the demand аnd supply side shocks, short run is important for them, wages and prices are rigid, expectations of the economic agents are rational, but also historical data are of great importance, and they introduced microeconomic foundations for their macroeconomic models. —
    Keywords: New-Keynesians,nominal rigidities,microeconomic foundations
    JEL: E00 E12
  7. Strategic Ambiguity in Games
    Date: 2013
    By: Riedel, Frank
    Sass, Linda
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80012&r=hpe
    In classic game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices as strategies and study the consequences for the basic results of normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. These equilibria turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play. —
    JEL: C72 D81 C70
  8. Selfish Altruism, Fierce Cooperation and the Emergence of Cooperative Equilibria from Passing and Shooting
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Askitas, Nikos (IZA)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7896&r=hpe
    There is continuing debate about what explains cooperation and self-sacrifice in nature and in particular in humans. This paper suggests a new way to think about this famous problem. I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two players in the presence of a predator (passing and shooting in 2-on-1 situations) is a fundamental conceptual building-block for understanding these phenomena. I show how, in the presence of a predator, cooperative equilibria rationally emerge among entirely selfish agents. If we examine the dynamics of such a model, and bias the lead player (ball possessor with pass/shoot i.e. cooperate/defect dilemma) in the selfish direction by only an infinitesimal amount, then, remarkably, the trajectories of the new system move towards a cooperative equilibrium. I argue that "predators" are common in the biological jungle but also in everyday human settings. Intuitively, this paper builds on the simple idea – a familiar one to a biologist observing the natural world but perhaps less so to social scientists – that everybody has enemies. As a technical contribution, I solve these models analytically in the unbiased case and numerically by an O(h5) approximation with the Runge-Kutta method.
    Keywords: evolutionary game theory, fitness, altruism, evolution of cooperation, decoy, Nash equlibrium, repeated matching-pennies game, predator, emergence, autonomous ODE, classical Runge-Kutta method
    JEL: C71 C73 D87
  9. A Dynamic Model of Belief-Dependent Conformity to Social Norms
    Date: 2013-12-27
    By: Sontuoso, Alessandro
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53234&r=hpe
    Human conduct is often guided by “conformist preferences”, which thrive on behavioral expectations within a society, with conformity being the act of changing one’s behavior to match the purported beliefs of others. Despite a growing research line considering preferences for a fair outcome allocation, economic theories do not explain the fundamental conditions for some social norm – whether of fairness or not – to be followed. Inspired by Bicchieri’s account of norms (C.Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society. CambridgeUP [2006]), I develop a behavioral theory of norm conformity building on the Battigalli-Dufwenberg “psychological” framework (P.Battigalli and M.Dufwenberg, Dynamic Psychological Games, J.Econ.Theory, 144:1-35 [2009]).
    Keywords: Conformist Preferences; Social Norms; Social Dilemmas; Psychological Game Theory; Behavioral Economics
    JEL: A13 C72 C92 D63 H41
  10. The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree
    Date: 2013
    By: Brink J.R. van den
    Talman A.J.J.
    Herings P.J.J.
    Laan G. van der (GSBE)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013001&r=hpe
    In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a permission structure on the set of players, in which players need permission to cooperate with other players. We assume the permission structure to be an oriented tree. This means that there is one player at the top of the permission structure and for every other player there is a unique directed path from the top player to this player. We introduce a new solution for these games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games. We provide two axiomatizations for this new value and compare it with the conjunctive permission value.
    Keywords: Cooperative Games;
    JEL: C71
  11. Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
    Date: 2013
    By: Herings P.J.J.
    Meshalkin A.V.
    Predtetchinski A. (GSBE)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013072&r=hpe
    We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn 1989, the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is accepted without delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We address the issue to what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium and characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal in the interior of the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is made and accepted. We characterize the values of the discount factor for which equilibria with one-period delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is possible and we construct subgame perfect equilibria such that arbitrary long delay occurs with probability one.
    Keywords: Noncooperative Games; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory;
    JEL: C72 C78
  12. Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions
    Date: 2013
    By: Vermeulen A.J.
    Schröder M.J.W.
    Peters H.J.M. (GSBE)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013049&r=hpe
    We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that i the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and ii there is an ex post Nash equilibrium in pure strategiesfor any preference profile.
    Keywords: Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design;
    JEL: C62 C70 D82
  13. From sets of equilibria to structures of interaction underlying binary games of strategic complements
    Date: 2013-12
    By: Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp655&r=hpe
    Consider a setting in which agents can each take one of two ordered actions and in which the incentive of any given agent to take the high action is positively reinforced by the number of other agents that take it. Furthermore, assume that we don’t know any other details about the game being played. What can we say about the details of the structure of the interaction between actions and incentives when we observe a set or a subset of all possible equilibria? In this paper we study 3 nested classes of games: (a) binary games of strategic complements; (b) games in (a) that admit a network representation: and (c) games in (b) in which the network is complete. Our main results are the following: It has long been established in the literature that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of any binary game of strategic complements among a set N of agents can be seen as a lattice on the set of all subsets of N under the partial order defined by the set inclusion relation. If the game happens to be strict in the sense that agents are never indifferent among outcomes (games in (a)), then the resulting lattice of equilibria satisfies a straightforward sparseness condition. (1) We show that, in fact, the games in (a) express all such lattices. (2) We characterize the collection of subsets of N that can be weakly expressed as the set of equilibria of some game of thresholds (games in (b)). (3) We characterize the collection of subsets of N that can be weakly expressed as the set of equilibria of some game of thresholds on the complete graph (games in (c)).
  14. Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets
    Date: 2012-03-01
    By: Elyès Jouini (CEREMADE – CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision – CNRS : UMR7534 – Université Paris IX – Paris Dauphine)
    Clotilde Napp (DRM – Dauphine Recherches en Management – CNRS : UMR7088 – Université Paris IX – Paris Dauphine)
    Yannick Viossat (CEREMADE – CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision – CNRS : UMR7534 – Université Paris IX – Paris Dauphine)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00778537&r=hpe
    Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very general learning process that favors beliefs leading to higher absolute or relative utility levels. We show that such a process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a game of strategic belief choices. The asymptotic beliefs are subjective and heterogeneous across the agents. Optimism (respectively overconfidence) as well as pessimism (respectively doubt) emerge from the learning process. Furthermore, we obtain a positive correlation between pessimism (respectively doubt) and risk tolerance. Under reasonable assumptions, beliefs exhibit a pessimistic bias and, as a consequence, the risk premium is higher than in a standard setting.
    Keywords: heterogeneous beliefs, Beliefs formation, evolutionary game theory, risk premium, pessimism
  15. Rock, Paper, Scissors, Lizard, Spock: Two-Person circulant Games
    Date: 2013
    By: Kern, Johannes
    Granic, Dura-Georg
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80032&r=hpe
    This paper presents a class of finite n x n bimatrix (2-player) games we coin Circulant Games. In Circulant Games, each player’s payoff matrix is a circulant matrix, i.e.\ each row vector is rotated one element relative to the preceding row vector. We show that when the payoffs in the first row of each payoff matrix are strictly ordered, a single parameter describing the rotation symmetry between the players’ matrices fully determines the exact number and the structure of all Nash Equilibria in these games. The class of Circulant Games contains well-known games such as matching pennies, rock-scissors-paper, circulant coordination and common interest games. —
    JEL: C70 C72 D00
  16. The Virtue Ethics Hypothesis: Is there a nexus between virtues and well-being?
    Date: 2013
    By: Koch, Christian
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80054&r=hpe
    Why do some people behave pro-socially while others do not? Using an experimental design based on Konow and Earley (JPubE, 2008), I investigate a reason already proposed by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics: He claims that there is a nexus between virtues and well-being and that enduring well-being cannot be achieved by hedonic pleasures and material affluence, but only by virtuous behavior. In order to analyze this hypothesis, I use a within-subject design. Initially, participants answer an elaborated well-being questionnaire and then play six different cooperation games. I examine two questions in connection with the Aristotelian idea: First, do more virtuously behaving subjects report on average higher well-being? Second, if the answer is affirmative, what is the underlying causal relationship? I find a favorable correlation between well-being and virtuous behavior and examine different hypotheses about what leads to virtuous behavior: My experimental data is mostly in line with the hypothesis that virtuous behavior is both a long-run cause as well as a short effect of a specific type of long-run well-being, called eudaimonic well-being. To this extent, I find evidence in favor of a nexus between virtues and well-being. —
    JEL: C91 D64 D03
  17. Voting in collective stopping games
    Date: 2013
    By: Herings P.J.J.
    Predtetchinski A. (GSBE)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013014&r=hpe
    At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question,the alternative is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins.We refer to this class of problems as collective stopping problems. Collective choicegames, quitting games, and coalition formation games are particular examples that fit nicely into this more general framework.When the core of this game is non–empty, a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies is shown to exist. But in general, even mixed stationary equilibria may not exist in collective stopping games. We consider strategies that are pure and action–independent, and allow for a limited degree of history dependence. Under such individual behavior, aggregate behavior can be conveniently summarized by a collective strategy. We consider collective strategies that are simple and induced by two–step game–plans and provide a constructive proof that this collection always contains a subgame perfect equilibrium. The existence of such an equilibrium is shown to imply the existence of a sequential equilibrium in an extended model with incomplete information. Collective equilibria are shown to be robust to perturbations in the dynamic process and in utilities. We apply our approach to the case with three alternatives exhibiting a Condorcet cycle and to the Baron-Ferejohn model of redistributive politics.
    Keywords: Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; Noncooperative Games; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory;
    JEL: C62 C72 C73 C78
  18. A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes
    Date: 2013
    By: Rodrigo Harrison
    Pedro Jara-Moroni
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:440&r=hpe
    Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, making the equilibrium less appealing. In this work we study a simple three player binary action global game with strategic substitutes for which we provide a condition for dominance solvability. This opens an unexplored research agenda on the study of global games with strategic substitutes.
  19. Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Itai Arieliy
    Yehuda (John) Levy
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp658&r=hpe
    We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to [Shmaya (2011)] entail determinacy of the game. We generalize [Shmaya (2011)]’s result and show that in the stochastic learning environment SEPM implies determinacy while WSEPM does not.
  20. Claim games for estate division problems
    Date: 2013
    By: Vermeulen A.J.
    Schröder M.J.W.
    Peters H.J.M. (GSBE)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013055&r=hpe
    This paper considers the estate division problem from a non-cooperative perspective. The integer claim game initiated by ONeill 1982 and extended by Atlamaz et al. 2011 is generalized by considering different sharing rules to divide every interval among the claimants. For problems with an estate larger than half of the total entitlements, we show that every sharing rule satisfying four fairly general axioms yields the same set of Nash equilibrium profiles and corresponding payoffs. Every rule that always results in such equilibrium payoff vector is characterized by the properties minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half. Well-known examples are the Talmud rule, the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule. Then our focus turns to more specific claim games, i.e. games that use the constrained equal awards rule, the Talmud rule, or the constrained equal losses rule as a sharing rule. Also a variation on the claim game is considered by allowing for arbitrary instead of integer claims.
    Keywords: Noncooperative Games; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances;
    JEL: C72 D74
  21. Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Abhijit Banerjee
    Esther Duflo
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19848&r=hpe
    This paper discusses the two leading views of history and political institutions. For some scholars, institutions are mainly products of historical logic, while for others, accidents, leaders, and decisions have a significant impact. We argue that while there is clear evidence that history matters and has long-term effects, there is not enough data to help us distinguish between the two views. Faced with this uncertainty, what is a social scientist to do? We argue that given the possibility that policy decisions indeed make a difference, it makes sense to assume they do and to try to improve policymaking.
    JEL: N30 O1
  22. Moral hypocrisy: Self-deception or impression management?
    Date: 2013
    By: Walkowitz, Gari
    Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik
    Irlenbusch, Bernd
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79701&r=hpe
    In four studies (S1-S4; N = 320) we investigated whether moral hypocrisy (MH) is motivated by conscious impression management concerns or whether it is self-deceptive. In a dictator game, MH occurred both within participants (saying one thing, doing another; S1) and between participants (doing one thing when it is inconsequential, doing another thing when it affects payoffs; S2). People were willing to let an ostensibly fair coin determine payoffs only if they could fudge the results of the coin flip, suggesting that hypocrites do not deceive themselves (S3). Also supporting this view, MH was associated with adherence to Conformity values (S1-S2), indicative of a desire to appear moral in the eyes of others but not indicative of self-deception. Universalism values were predictive of moral integrity (S1, S3-S4). Applying our findings, we show that MH can be reduced by increasing the collective awareness about its prevalence in a specific situation (S4). —
    JEL: A13 C91 M14
  23. "The Rational Expectations Hypothesis: An Assessment from Popper’s Philosophy"
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Ivan H. Ayala
    Alfonso Palacio-Vera
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_786&r=hpe
    The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) is the standard approach to expectations formation in macroeconomics. We discuss its compatibility with two strands of Karl Popper’s philosophy: his theory of knowledge and learning, and his "rationality principle" (RP). First, we show that the REH is utterly incompatible with the former. Second, we argue that the REH can nevertheless be interpreted as a heuristic device that facilitates economic modeling and, consequently, it may be justified along the same lines as Popper’s RP. We then argue that, our position as to the resolution of this paradox notwithstanding, Popper’s philosophy provides a metatheoretical framework with which we can evaluate the REH. Within this framework, the REH can be viewed as a heuristic device or strategy that fulfils the same function as, for instance, the optimizing assumption. However, we believe that the REH imparts a serious methodological bias, since, by implying that macroeconomic instability is caused exclusively by "exogenous" shocks that randomly hit the economy, it precludes the analysis of any sources of inherent instability caused by the making of (nonrandom) errors by individuals, and hence it favors the creation of an institutional configuration that may be ill suited to address this type of instability.
    Keywords: Popper; Knowledge; Rational Expectations; Learning; Trial; Error Elimination
    JEL: A12 B41 B50 D84

nep-hpe 2014-02-21, 15 papers

NEP: New Economics Papers
History and Philosophy of Economics

Edited by: Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba
Issue date: 2014-02-21
Papers: 15

This issue of nep-hpe is sponsored by the University of Queensland, who have released a call for Papers for their Asia-Pacific Productivity Conference in July 2014. Deadline is 15 March. Find out more here: http://inomics.com/node/17334.

Access to full contents may be restricted. To subscribe/unsubscribe follow this link;http://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-hpe

In this issue we have:

  1. Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz – statistician, economist, and a European intellectual Wolfgang Karl Härdle; Annette B. Vogt; ;
  2. The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira
  3. Learning a Population Distribution Seung Han Yoo
  4. Two Additional Remarks on Conformism Schlicht, Ekkehart
  5. A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin Hwang, Sung-Ha; Newton, Jonathan
  6. Eugen Ehrlich — State Law and Law Enforcement in Societal Systems Mikhail Antonov
  7. Linear Transforms, Values and Least Square Approximation for Cooperation Systems. Ulrich Faigle; Michel Grabisch
  8. Economic Growth Evens-Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys Andrew E. Clark; Sarah Flèche; Claudia Senik
  9. Econometrics: An Historical Guide for the Uninitiated Stephen Pollock
  10. Quelle intelligence du capital pour demain ? Une lecture du Capital au XXIème siècle de Thomas Piketty. Gaël Giraud
  11. Teaching Sustainable Development Issues: An Assessment of the Learning Effectiveness of Gaming Odile Blanchard; Arnaud Buchs
  12. On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave’s contribution. Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay
  13. The Effect of Behavioral Codes and Gender on Honesty Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Siniver, Erez; Tobol, Yossi
  14. Campesinos, Estado y mercado. La conflictividad forestal en el Noroeste de España, León (1870­ ‐1936) José Serrano Álvarez
  15. A New Approach to Explaining the Value of Colonial Paper Money: Evidence from New Jersey, 1709-1775 Farley Grubb

Contents.

  1. Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz – statistician, economist, and a European intellectual
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Wolfgang Karl Härdle
    Annette B. Vogt
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-015&r=hpe
    Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz (1868 – 1931) was a European statistician. His scientific work covered theoretical economics, stochastics, mathematical statistics and radiology, today we would call him a cross disciplinary scientist. With his clear views on mathematical principles with their applications in these fields he stood in conflict with the mainstream economic schools in Germany at the dawn of the 20th century. He had many prominent students (Gumbel, Leontief, Freudenberg among them) and he carved out the path of modern statistical thinking. He was a true European intellectual with a career path from St. Petersburg via Gottingen to Straßburg and finally the Berliner Universität, now Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He is known for the precise calibration of insurance claims applying the – at that time hardly known – Poisson distribution to Prussian horse kick and child suicide data. He proposed a simple solution to the Marxian transformation problem and wrote numerous articles and books on the mathematical treatment of statistical (including radiological physical) data. In this article we sketch his life and work and point out the prominent role that he has in today’s statistical thinking.
    Keywords: History of science, Statistics, Horse kicks, Bortkiewicz
    JEL: N01 D02 B14 B16
  2. The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Maruta, Toshimasa
    Okada, Akira
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:econdp:2014-03&r=hpe
    Abstract: We consider the formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conflicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model of Young (1993) is applied to a game of group formation where voluntary participants negotiate for an institution to enforce them to cooperate. For a class of group formation games with two types, the stochastically stable equilibrium can be characterized in terms of the Nash products of the associated hawk-dove games, which summarize the strategic interaction among the individuals in the game.
    Keywords: Adaptive play, cooperation, evolution, group formation, hawk-dove game, social dilemma, stochastic stability, voluntary participation
    JEL: C70 C72
  3. Learning a Population Distribution
    Date: 2014
    By: Seung Han Yoo (Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iek:wpaper:1401&r=hpe
    This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes’ rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each player’s strategy is a function not only of the player’s type but also of experience. Second, we show that each player’s initial belief about the population distribution converges almost surely to a "correct" belief.
    Keywords: Bayesian games, Dynamic games, Bayesian learning
    JEL: C72 C73 D83
  4. Two Additional Remarks on Conformism
    Date: 2014-02-13
    By: Schlicht, Ekkehart
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:18376&r=hpe
    Abstract This note offers two comments on the article “Social Influences towards Conformism in Economic Experiments” by Hargreaves Heap that is to appear in the Economics e-Journal. One relates to the concept of conformism, the other lines out some phenomena where an explicit recognition of group processes, such as conformism, may be analytically helpful.
    Keywords: Conformism; relative income hypothesis; reference group behavior; social multiplier; social preferences; self-classification; group polarization
    JEL: C91 C92 D43 H41 J41 D1
  5. A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Hwang, Sung-Ha
    Newton, Jonathan
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9993&r=hpe
    For games of contracting under perturbed best response dynamics, varying the perturbations along two dimensions (uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected) gives four possibilities. Three of these select differing major bargaining solutions as stochastically stable. The fourth possibility yields a new bargaining solution which exhibits significant nonmonotonicities and demonstrates the interplay of two key drivers of evolutionary selection: (i) the ease of making errors; (ii) the ease of responding to errors.
    Keywords: bargaining; adaptive learning; Evolution
  6. Eugen Ehrlich — State Law and Law Enforcement in Societal Systems
    Date: 2014
    By: Mikhail Antonov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:33/law/2014&r=hpe
    In this article, the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich and its relation to state law and judicial law enforcement. The attention is focused on the practical implications of this conception on the functioning of judicial systems. Analyzing the criticism raised against Ehrlich’s conception, the author emphasizes that this thinker stood on a scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative — between Is and Ought — considering any attempt to draw a net distinction between societal phenomena as pointless. Ehrlich sought to enlarge the province of jurisprudence through the application of sociological methods to the factual material from which arise social institutions. These institutions crystallize social practices into rules of behaviour, but this crystallization does not happen automatically. It requires an intellectual reconstruction of these practices by the actors acting in the legal order. A scientific examination of law implies that all these components (social facts, institutions, mental constructions, rules and norms) are taken into consideration. Ehrlich critically assesses both the state-centrist ideology of the doctrinal law and the metaphysic speculations about law, arguing that correct law enforcement needs to rely on sociological analysis. The judge should take advantage of methods of sociological research, which allows stating the actual trends of justice in society and comparing these trends with those existing at the time the applicable legal rules were adopted. This comparison leads to a correct balancing of the conflicting interests with a view to the values protected by the legal order. At the same time, the sociological data just help the judge to reveal the will of the lawmaker who would protect the conflicting interests in the same manner as those which were protected when the lawmaker adopted the legal rules in question.
    Keywords: Eugen Ehrlich, sociology of law, judiciary, rules of law, law enforcement, free finding of the law, normativity
    JEL: K10
  7. Linear Transforms, Values and Least Square Approximation for Cooperation Systems.
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Ulrich Faigle (Universität zu Köln – Mathematisches Institut)
    Michel Grabisch (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Paris School of Economics)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14010&r=hpe
    We study linear properties of TU-games, revisiting well-known issues like interaction transforms, the inverse Shapley value problem and the concept of semivalues and least square values. We embed TU-games into the model of cooperation systems and influence patterns, which allows us to introduce linear operators on games in a natural way. We focus on transforms, which are linear invertible maps, relate them to bases and investigate many examples (Möbius transform, interaction transform, walsh transform, etc.). In particular, we present a simple solution to the inverse problem in its general form: Given a linear value ? and a game v, find all games v? such that ?(v) = ?(v?). Generalizing Hart and Mas-Colell’s concept of a potential, we introduce general potentials and show that every linear value is induced by an appropriate potential. We furthermore develop a general theory of allocations with a quadratic optimality criterion under linear constraints, obtaining results of Charnes et al., and Ruiz et al., and others as special cases. We prove that this class of allocations coincides exactly with the class of all linear values.
    Keywords: Cooperation system, cooperative game, basis, transform, inverse problem, potential, linear value, semivalue.
    JEL: C71
  8. Economic Growth Evens-Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))

    Sarah Flèche (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))

    Claudia Senik (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] – Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), UP4 – Université Paris 4, Paris-Sorbonne – Université Paris IV – Paris Sorbonne – Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique)

    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00936145&r=hpe
    In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has dropped in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the "very unhappy" and the "perfectly happy". The extension of public amenities has certainly contributed to this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact comes as an addition to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries.
    Keywords: Happiness ; Inequality ; Economic growth ; Development ; Easterlin paradox
  9. Econometrics: An Historical Guide for the Uninitiated
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Stephen Pollock
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:14/05&r=hpe
    This essay was written to accompany a lecture to beginning students of the course of Economic Analytics, which is taught in the Institute of Econometrics of the University of Lodz in Poland. It provides, within a few pages, a broad historical account the development of econometrics. It begins by describing the origin of regression analysis and it concludes with an account of cointegration analysis. The purpose of the essay is to provide a context in which the students can locate various aspects of econometric analysis. A distinction must be made between the means by which new ideas were propagated and the manner and the circumstances in which they have originated. This account is concerned primarily with the propagation of the ideas.
    Keywords: econometrics, regression analysis, cointegration analysis, statistical analysis
    JEL: B16 B23
  10. Quelle intelligence du capital pour demain ? Une lecture du Capital au XXIème siècle de Thomas Piketty.
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Gaël Giraud (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Paris School of Economics)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14007&r=hpe
    I offer a critical reading of Thomas Piketty’s book, Le Capital au XXIème siècle, Seuil, 2013.
    Keywords: Capital, capitalism, inequality, Kaldor, Solow.
    JEL: B22 B4 H20 N10
  11. Teaching Sustainable Development Issues: An Assessment of the Learning Effectiveness of Gaming
    Date: 2014-01
    By: Odile Blanchard (PACTE – Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires – Institut d’Études Politiques [IEP] – Grenoble – CNRS : UMR5194 – Université Pierre-Mendès-France – Grenoble II – Université Joseph Fourier – Grenoble I)

    Arnaud Buchs (Institut de géographie et durabilité – Université de Lausanne)

    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00946227&r=hpe
    The article aims at assessing the effectiveness of a role-play in addressing two concerns: clarifying the concept of sustainable development and teaching sustainable development issues. The effectiveness is gauged by surveying students to reveal how the game matches a set of "significant learning" criteria defined by Fink (2003). Firstly, our article brings a short overview of how the concept of sustainable development has emerged and spread over time. Secondly, in order to assess the learning potential of our role-play, we examine how it addresses the six components of Fink’s taxonomy of "significant learning": (i) foundational knowledge, (ii) application, (iii) integration, (iv) human dimensions, (v) caring and, (vi) learning how to learn. This taxonomy is analysed through a rigorous assessment methodology. The assessment shows that our role-play is highly praised by the players as it not only brings them foundational knowledge, but also allows them to enhance many skills. Thus, the framework of this role-play contributes to educating about sustainable development as well as educating for sustainable development.
    Keywords: education ; role-play ; significant learning; sustainable development
  12. On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave’s contribution.
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne et Centre Walras Pareto – Université de Lausanne)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14004&r=hpe
    This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standars textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave’s contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable – from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson’s mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave’s emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue. This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook.
    Keywords: Richard A. Musgrave, social goods, public goods, non-rivalry, non-exclusion.
    JEL: H41 B29 A22
  13. The Effect of Behavioral Codes and Gender on Honesty
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Arbel, Yuval (School of Business, Carmel Academic Center)
    Bar-El, Ronen (Open University of Israel)
    Siniver, Erez (College of Management, Rishon Lezion Campus)
    Tobol, Yossi (Jerusalem College of Technology (JTC))
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7946&r=hpe
    We examine the effect of adherence to behavioral codes, as measured by the degree of religiosity, on the level of honesty by conducting under-the-cup die experiments. The findings suggest that behavioral codes, which prohibit lying, offset the monetary incentive to lie. The highest level of honesty is found among young religious females while the lowest is found among secular females. Moreover, when the monetary incentive to lie is removed, the tendency of secular subjects to lie disappears. Given the strict separation between the secular and religious education systems the research findings confirm the importance of education in instilling ethical values.
    Keywords: honesty, religion, behavioral codes, ethical values
    JEL: C91 D63 Z12
  14. Campesinos, Estado y mercado. La conflictividad forestal en el Noroeste de España, León (1870­ ‐1936)
    Date: 2014-02
    By: José Serrano Álvarez
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:seh:wpaper:1402&r=hpe
    In the 19th Century the Spanish State privatised large areas of common lands and took over management of common wastelands and woodlands, thus stripping the peasants of all the control they had over them. Just as in many other parts of Spain, State intervention in wastelands and woodlands in León was a controversial issue because it was a symptom of conflicting visions or interests: between the State that promoted forestry uses and the peasants whose livelihood, based on agriculture and cattle, depended on common lands. The aim of this paper is to study the motivation behind peasant resistances to State intervention in Northwest Spain in the period 1870-1936. Although the conflicts have been explained from different perspectives (as resistance to market penetration, as "weapons of the poor", or as environmental conflicts), here we argue that the tensions and disputes over the common lands represent the peasants’ defence of their livelihoods as well as the struggle for the "opportunities" the market offered.
    Keywords: Northwest Spain, Common lands, Peasant resistances, Forest crime
    JEL: D70 L73 N54 P32
  15. A New Approach to Explaining the Value of Colonial Paper Money: Evidence from New Jersey, 1709-1775
    Date: 2014-02
    By: Farley Grubb
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19903&r=hpe
    A new approach to explaining the value of colonial paper money that relies on their distinctive character as bills of credit is presented. The market value of these bills is decomposed into their real asset present value and their liquidity premium value. This approach is applied to the newly reconstructed monetary data for colonial New Jersey. New Jersey’s bills were structured as zero-interest bearer bonds. They had defined future redemption payoff dates in specie equivalents. The New Jersey government redeemed their bills on time as legislatively promised under a fiscally credible redemption tax structure. The real asset present value of New Jersey bills accounted for at least 80 percent, whereas the value of these bills as “money” accounted for at most 10 to 20 percent, of their market value. Colonial paper money was not primarily a fiat currency. New Jersey’s paper money did not depreciate. It traded below face value due to time-discounting; not depreciation. A positive liquidity premium implies that New Jersey’s paper money actually traded at an appreciated value over its real asset present value. That liquidity premium was positively associated with the quantity of paper money per capita in circulation and the method of monetary injection.
    JEL: E31 E42 E51 N11 N21 N41

Nueva entrada del blog Pasado y Presente de la Economía Mundial: Los componentes de la inequidad y su sentido e n el largo plazo, por Esteban Nicolini

Nueva entrada del blog Pasado y Presente de la Economía Mundial: Los componentes de la inequidad y su sentido en el largo plazo, por Esteban Nicolini

http://pasadoypresenteblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/21/los-componentes-de-la-inequidad-y-su-sentido-en-el-largo-plazo/

En esta entrada del blog juntaremos dos temas que se han tratado en este sitio: el primero es la evolución de la inequidad global en el largo plazo; el otro es el de la reconstrucción de los PIBs regionales en el mundo y en América Latina en particular.


“As in the modern world.” Foreign and Domestic Equities in the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928

This week in the blog Manuel Bautista comments on

Bloody Foreigners! Overseas Equity on the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928.

Richard S. Grossman, Wesleyan University

Please follow us at

http://www.nephis.org

Best wishes

Bernardo
@BatizLazo


In Memoriam: John Munro (1938-2013)

In Memoriam: John Munro (1938–2013)

Posted on http://medieval.utoronto.ca/category/news/ 28 December 2013 by Martin Pickavé

It is with deep regret that the Centre for Medieval Studies learned of the death 23 December 2013 of John H. A. Munro, Professor Emeritus of Economics and Medieval Studies. To quote Munro’s close friend and colleague Herman van der Wee of the University of Leuven, we mourn the loss of ‘an unrivalled master, a devoted teacher, and a faithful friend.’

John Munro was among the world’s leading authorities on late medieval and early modern monetary, financial, and industrial history, with over 150 publications to his credit during a distinguished career that spanned fifty years.

John Munro was born in Vancouver and took a combined honours BA in Economics and History in 1960 at the University of British Columbia before proceeding to Yale, where he completed a PhD in medieval economic history under the supervision of Roberto Lopez in 1964. After an initial appointment in History and Economics at UBC, he was invited in 1968 to join the Department of Political Economy (from 1982, the Department of Economics) at the University of Toronto, where he was tenured in 1970 and promoted Full Professor in 1973. From the moment of his appointment in Toronto, Munro took a leading role at the Centre for Medieval Studies, supervising or co-s! upervising over twenty doctoral dissertations, serving as Associate Director from 1976 to 1979, and influencing several generations of students through his legendary graduate seminar on ‘The Dynamics of the European Economy, 1300-1750.’

John Munro was the recipient of many research grants and academic honours. Among the latter, he was proudest of his election in 1999 to the Comitato Scientifico of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica ‘Francesco Datini’ in Prato and his appointment four years later to the institute’s executive committee; of the recognition of his pioneering research on the economy of the late medieval Low Countries by election as a Foreign Member of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts in 2000; and of his election in 2011 to a Life-Time Fellowship of the Medieval Academy of Americ! a.

In March 2004, several of John Munro’s former doctoral students organized an international workshop at the Centre for Medieval Studies to mark his retirement, the proceedings of which were published as a Festschrift under the title Money, Markets, and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of John H. A. Munro, L. Armstrong, I. Elbl, and M. Elbl, eds.(Leiden, 2007).

John Munro’s research interests focused mainly on the Low Countries and England, though his publications extend to topics as diverse as the usury prohibition, medieval demographics, and international merchant law. His major publications are: Wool, Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, ca. 1340-1478 (Brussels and Toronto, 1973); Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History, ed. Erik Aerts and John Munro, Studies in Social and Economic History, Vol. 19 (Leuven, 1990);Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350 – 1500(London, 1992);! Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries (London, 1994); and (as editor and contributor)Money in the Pre-Industrial World: Bullion, Debasements and Coin Substitutes, Financial History Series no. 20 (London, 2012).

Lawrin Armstrongnewsletter


La producción y los precios agropecuarios en Michoacán en el siglo XVIII (México, 22 de febrero de 2014)

Buen día les solicito la siguiente publicación:

Presentación del libro XXXV Feria Internacional del Libro del Palacio de Minería

La producción y los precios agropecuarios en Michoacán en el siglo XVIII.
El mercado regional colonial

Autor. Jorge Silva Riquer

Presentadores:

Carlos Marichal, El Colegio de México

Alejandro Tortolero, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa

Palacio de Minería
Sábado 22 de febrero de 2014, salón 6, 16:00

Informes Jorge Silva Riquer, jsriquer @ gmail.com


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